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Endgame: The Colonial Economy Runs Down
1983 saw no improvement in Namibia’s economic position, only a continuation of 
the stagnation and decline which has prevailed since 1979* Department of 
•Finance estimates1 show negative growth of territorial production of 2.2$ in 
1980, positive growth of 2.5% in 1981 and negative again by 1.6% iin 1982. 
1983 showed a 7% decline. Overall 1 9 8 3 GTP is probably of the order of 9% 
below 1 9 7 9 or down over 20‘S per capita. 1984 prospects are for either 
stagnation or a further decline.
The estimates for the core of the economy - agriculture, fisheries and mining 
are -3-3% in 1980, -8.7$ in 1981, -7 .2% in 1982.2 For 1983 the decline to 
-11$ and in 1984 the fall might slow to -2$ or bottom out. The per capita 
decline 1979-83 for the primary producing sectors is thus over 40$. For 
mining real 1983 output was at a 7 year low and for agriculture and fishing at 
a 15 year low. Rapid expansion - at least in official territorial accounts 
terms - of government spending, largely on 'Bantustans' and 
’defence/security', masks much of this fall in the overall GTP.
The 1 9 83—34 budget originally estimated at R1 ,036 million is now expected to 
come to R1 ,100 million^ of which R230 million odd are borrowing and deficit, 
R286 million RSA grants, R560 domestic taxation and charges plus customs and 
excise from RSA. Most of the increases during the year appear to relate to 
salary increases and/or second tier authority ("homelands'1) misspending.4 The 
Thiricn Committee seemed to find improper practices wherever it turned, from 
white civil servants through "homeland" politicians to diamond price 
declarations oy Consolidated Diamond Manes.
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Prime Minister Botha asserted that Namibia would cost RSA 1,143 millionJ in 
1984/85 - excluding "SWA/Nambia external borrowing" from South African
financial institutions. Indeed he offered to donate the territory to the
7Contact Group if its members would take over the cost of supporting it. The
8 9drought broke only partially , karakul demand recovery was tentative7, herds
were down"' ^  and fishing recovery was from a very low base. 1 1
12The Observer's September 1983 headline "Corrupt and broke Namibia a
'hostage' to Pretoria" summed up how the economy looked to many external and 
domestic observers. Neo-laissez faire liberal millionaire Eric Lang made two 
major 'disclosures' - the first his 'the party is over' address to the German 
Settler Interest Group attacking the rapid rise of government spending, 
especially in support of "homelands" of May 25, 1983 and the second his June
20 leakage of a 'Confidential' Department of Finance report to the
Administrator General projecting a decline from de facto to total bankruptcy 
by 1987/88.
1 3The Financial Mail inquired "Is there life before independence?" and
speculated that the costs to RSA of hanging on in Namibia would lead RSA to
abandon "linkage" (to Cuban presence in Angola) and pull out in the forseeable
future. The most positive statement seemed to be that of CDM Executive
Director Doug Eoffe when he said (although slightly distancing himself from
14his own statement):
the present stagnation of the Namibian economy may be a great deal 
more satisfactory than the economic convulsions that could
follow... a regime with strong socialist or Marxist objectives.
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In other words, better the uncertainty we know than the certainty 
that would follow unwelcome economic policies.
On the face of it the Namibian economy rather resembled a (presumptive) typo 
on the South African economy in the Edenvale News: ^
Although the South African economic position is not what we would 
like it to be at present, all the indications are there that it 
will improve but we must not expect this to be improvement, but we 
must not expect this to be.
Indeed so. The economy is wrecked and has no future. Or is that true? Real 
as the economic problems of the Namibian economy - buffeted by the long metal 
price recession, the delayed recovery of demand for high quality gem diamonds, 
the karakul market bust, depleted fish stocks, administrative and fiscal 
mismanagement bordering on lunacy and war are - some of the official documents 
and pronouncements appear to be disinformation.10
In particular the Department of Finance Report and Prime Minister Botha's 
speech seem to be seeking to demonstrate: a) that Namibia cannot be viable as
an independent country and b) is a millstone on the RSA budget - a position 
equally useful in arguing for a strong RSA/Contact Group role after 
independence or for abandoning nSWA/Namibia" as an economic luxury South 
Africa cannot afford.
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Mr. Hoffe - on closer reading - appears to have been lecturing SWAPO on the
need for 'moderation' as he actually concentrated on what an independent
Namibia should and should not do from staying in the Customs Union through
joining SADCC and the Commonwealth to attaining self sufficiency in food
production. His stress on mining as an economic dynamo (Anglo-De 3eers in
addition to owning CUM indirectly controls Tsumeb/Otjihase as well as prime
coal and uranium prospects) which, if given a tax structure that allows
"proper returns on risk capital, especially high-risk capital in mining", can
continue to be financed by South African companies so that "this country can
enter a second and more advanced state of its economic development" sounds
remarkably like a manifesto for CDM-Anglo-De Beer’s playing an enhanced role
in an independent Namibia and implicitly one he does not 3ee as an 'economic
basket case’. Whatever one may think of the realism of his strategic economic
sketch plan it seems to be based on a belief that an independent Namibia could
prosper and his corporate group prosper in it. Professor Wolfgang Thomas,
sometime economic advisor to Dirk Mudge and the shrewdest analyst and most
innovative proponent of a "moderate" (neo-colonial?) economy has done a
devastating critique of the "Alleged Financial Crisis" as set out in the
18Department of Finance Memo demonstrating that it is so technically ludicrous 
and 30 systematically over pessimistic as to past and future trends (and so 
divergent from actual policy as contained in the 1933/84 3udget by the same 
department) as to suggest that it was disinformation intended to be leaked via 
Lang and the Windhoek Observer who could be expected to give maximum publicity 
and credibility to its attacks on its own budget and policies without 
immediately suspecting they were being used.
17
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The Rich, The Mew Middle Class and The Poor
Namibia remains a eountry with huge disparities of income. For upper echelon
whites1  ^ an administrative officer can get R11,433-21,720; senior nurses 
R12,369-21.720; a ’homeland’ Department Director R23>634-27>462; a. Central 
Department Deputy Director R34,239 and a Company Secretary R40,000 - all plus 
fringe benefits averaging perhaps 20$. For artisans and clerical personnel 
the rates are lower - perhaps R8-12,500 plus fringe benefits. Allowing for 
inflation this represents nothing new.
But the new black middle class - the beneficiaries of the "buy a bantustan
policy” in the public sector and the drive to position themselves for the long
20haul by major companies - is. By 1984 they numbered about between 30 and
40,000 (15-20$ of all black households) with R3>500 - R15,000 a year. This - 
especially in the public sector - is a very recent phenomenon, largely 
post-1980.21
It is in many ways not a positive one with the possible exception of mining. 
First, the basic aim of the increases has been to divide the black community 
by buying off its most skilled and educated components plus some 'traditional' 
and 'self made' political leaders cum bodyguards, 'homeguards' and Koevet 
(literally crowbar - actually killer, terror kcmando). While this probably 
will not work in terms of political allegiance for the majority of those with
real skills - especially in health and medicine it does create quasi-class
divisions between them and the other 80$ of black Namibians and make them
likely political opponents of the more egalitarian income distribution 
strategy advocated - rather vaguely - oy SWAP0. Second, while R3,500 is not a
very high income in purchasing power terms by white Southern African or
developed country standards, it is very much above the average wage or self
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employed income level possible in a country with a territorial output per 
capita of about R 1,000 - 1,100. Third, the salary and employment number
increases which created the public sector side of this middle class are the 
primary cause of wages and salaries rising to 60$ of the Recurrent Budget (30 
to 40$ is a more normal share) and of the Budget’s deficit. Pruning numbers 
and real incomes will be necessary if independent Namibia is to move to 
universal basic service provision without a continued huge Recurrent Budget 
deficit. That poses a problem - selling reductions of incomes achieved under 
colonial rule to the bulk of black clerical, skilled and professional workers 
as an immediate 'fruit of independence’ is likely to prove difficult.
A recent IDA? study22 and other work2  ^ suggest that for Namibians outside this
'new middle class' the situation is quite different. Those in regular
non-mine urban employment seem to receive an average wage of R 1,500 a year;
those in domestic service and ranching work perhaps R600-800 and those in the
'residual' sector ('homelands’, pensioners, unemployed) perhaps R200. As the
latest Household Subsistence Level study estimates HSL for a family of 6 in
Windhoek at R3,600 a year and the cost of living increase has been in the
12-16$ a year range for some years, these are all grimly low rates. Earlier
studies suggested 86$ of black wage earners in Windhoek and 99$ of households
25in the North were receiving less than the HSL as were 30$ in Xhomasdal
2 6(Windhoek's 'coloured location') in 1982." While the "buy a bantustan" 
approach has probably reduced the per cent of households below HSL in the
North to 85, the other percentages probably remain valid.
The economic decline has led to falling employment. Together with war related 
dislocation and looser enforcement of residence controls (in their
housing/compound permit, 'vagrancy' form) this has boosted open (urban)
unemployment to 30-80,00027 or 6 to 15$ of the economically active population
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and 15-40* of those in officially estimated wage employment (200,000). 
Declines in employment have been widespread including mining (down 13-656 to 
16,903 in 1983), engineering where two large firms retrenched (one as part 
of its takeover of another)*^, fishing and agriculture.
Fiscal Irresponsibility and Creative Accounting: "SWA/Namibia" Budgeting
The 1983/84 Budget as amended is likely to show an expenditure outturn of 
R1,100 million, locally collected revenues of R310 million, R250 million RSA 
transfers under the Customs Union formula in lieu of import and excise duties. 
R286 million RSA transfers (including about R150 million for 'security'), R195 
million external borrowing, R32 million deficit (drawdown of balances) and R35 
million of 1982-83 balances.^0
The increases in expenditure above the initial budget^"1 appear to be largely
on wage and salary increments, 'security' and overspending by 'Representative
Authorities'. The revised 'RAf or 'second tier' spending on central budget
account seems likely to exceed R325 million (R250 million Recurrent, R35
million Capital, R25 million covering 1982-83 overspending) for 1983-84 versus
32R185 million in 1982—83• This component of the budget is indeed out of 
control - neither value for money, administrative competence nor honesty in 
use is being achieved.
Total expenditure deflated by price changes is not increasing rapidly - pace 
the Department of Finance. The first reasonably integrated "SWA/Namibia" 
budget was that of 1981/82 at R837-5 million. Prior budgets did not include a 
variety of items then on 'HA' or South African accounts. By 1983/84 unit 
costs (including wgaes and salaries) had risen at least 30$. Therfore a
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constant real expenditure figure for 1983/84 at 1981/32 level3 would have been 
R1,090 million odd or almost exactly the probable 1983/84 estimated actual. 
The reason government spending is rising as a share of current cost GTP is 
twofold: GTP is falling and the unit cost of the governments * s spending is 
rising much faster than prices in other sectors.
The cost inefficiency of "SWA/Namibia" spending is all too evident. "RA" and 
"National" Education in 1983-84 will come to about R140 million on recurrent 
and capital account and Health to over R100 million. Adding 20? for voluntary 
agency and consumer/user payments yields R 155 million and R120 million or 
about 10? (Education) and 8? (Health) of probably current price 1983/84 G T P . ^  
These are very high shares of GTP for a low or middle income country to expend 
on education and health but - with the exception of lower standard primary 
education - they do not yield even an approximation of universal access to 
basic services. Similarly the wage and salary to recurrent spending ratio of 
60? is astounding - 30 to 40? is more normal. It implies either grossly too 
high (relative to average output per capita) salaries, gros3 overstaffing 
relative to other heads of spending (and perhaps absolutely) or both. In fact 
in the "SWA/Namibia" case both appears to be the answer.
The 'decrease* in per centage local funding over 1981/82 - 1983/84 is not 3 0  
self evident. In 1981/82 direct RSA transfers and external borrowing were 
R374 million or about 46? of total spending. In 1983/84 they are likely to be 
R480 million or 44?. Further the Customs and Excise revenue has been static 
despite an apparent 20? odd increase in the import/exciseabie production base. 
Had it risen proportionátely transfers/external borrowing would have been R50 
million, less or 39? of expenditure.
39? is a high level but one clearly boosted by fiscal irresponsibility, lack
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of value for money, drought, world recession and a worsening war situation.
In the absence of these, tax revenue (especially on minerals) might have been 
R100 million higher (plus the R50 million on customs/excise), emergency 
drought relief and security expenditure R50-100 million lower and savings on a 
less fragmented and more competent administration/service delivery system at 
least R100 million. That would have reduced expenditure to R900-95Q million 
and the need for external funding and local borrowing to R130-180 million or 
15 to 17% of total spending. Further had external loans been on semi soft 
terms debt service would have been at least R 30-40 million lower. The 
resultant 1 1— 1 3% financing requirement could not be viewed as particularly 
unusual for a small, relatively poor country.
The external debt by the end of calendar 1984 is likely to be of the order of 
R700 million with gross borrowing R200 million plus a year. At an average 
interest rate of 14% and term of 10 years this would imply a 1985 debt service 
burden of over R175 million - more than twice 1983/84 estimates. The 
implications of such a progression - if an independent Namibia chooses to 
accept liability - are serious. R175 million is of the order of 20^ of export 
earnings and over 2555 of probable 1985 local revenue. 3y the end of 1986 the 
debt would probably have passed R 1,000 million and debt service (depending on 
RSA interest rates) in 1987 could be about R300 million. The crushing burden 
servicing this paper would entail,- combined with its patent invalidity at 
international law following the 1971 International Court of Justice decision^4 
and the fact that it has all been issued by the Administrator General and 
unconditionally guaranteed by South Africa and is nearly all held by South 
African financial institutions despite RSA claims to the contrary, strongly 




1984/85 Budget flows are likely to be of the order of R1,200 million with 
increases concentrated on debt service, security and "RA’3". Excluding debt 
service and assuming a 12* unit cost increase this would imply a real decrease 
of 4 to 5 %. RSA transfers (excluding the still unchanged customs/excise
element) are likekly to be about R320 million"^, external borrowing R200 
million and locally collected revenues about R400 million including RIO 
million on an increase in the general 3ales tax from 7% to 9*"^ and a 
continued recovery of mineral taxation relating to CDM and Rossing. The 
external finance share at R520 million would in that case fall slightly to
4 3 .356.
Mining: Holding On
"A year of consolidation, rather than a year of progress" was the President of
R7the Chamber of Mines summary of 1983- Output remained fairly constant -
although with the 1983 closing of Matchless in the Tsumeb group-5 and the 1984
cave in which reduced the ex-Falconbridge Gamites mine to one year’s life
expectancy the downward trend must be expected to be renewed in 1984 and 1985
unless the spotty diamond recovery entends to high grade, large gems thus
justifying COM’s raising output from a 1982-84 flow of about 1 million carats,
the lowest levels in 30 years. As Mr Hoffe had pointed out a year earlier'"
over 80Í of the sector's output comes from three mines - Tsumeb which is an
old base metal mine with limited (5 to 8 year) reserves, COM an old diamond
mine but with proven reserves to post-2000 and Rossing, a young uranium oxide
40mine with reserves to 2006 and prospects for additional provings.
Mineral prices fared badly in 1983 as the industrial economy recovery failed 
to restore demand - albeit the sinking rand did raise local revenues in 1983
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and will do so dramatically in 1984. Costs continued to rise sharply fuelled 
by the high inflation rate Namibia imports from South Africa. As a result 
only CDM and Rossing earned significant profits and most mines had severe cash 
flow problems. Mining tax (excluding diamond export levy) in 1983/84 
recovered from R20 million to R73 million in the estimates and R84 million in 
the estimated actuals but only because Rossings tax allowances were finally 
exhausted and CDM’s profits recovered somewhat more than anticipated. By 
comparison in 1979/80 - when Rossing was still tax free - the tax take was 
R142 million.
Economies included reducing employees 13*6$ from 19>564 in 1982 to 16,903 in
1983. Total wages fell by 4 .2% implying an increase of about 13-5% per
employee. While existing capacity was kept maintained and operating,
exploration - especially by prospective entrants as opposed to firms already
producing in Namibia - was low. Training was emphasised in the report as
critical to the industry’s future with the industry commissioned Verster
Report seen as a foundation for identifying needs for company run training
programmes.^"1 The same theme had been stressed by Hoffe who argued more
42generally that "Skills shortage is Namibia’s main handicap."
The AG continued to take a harder line than South Africa on unregistered trade 
unions, stating that agreements with them were not binding and implying that 
they were dangerous and radical. Hi3 points evidently relate to the SWAPO 
linked National Union of Namibian Workers which was broken by RTZ but 
maintains de facto working relations with CUM and to a lesser degree Tsumeb. 
The (white, albeit formally non-racial) SWA Miners Union has begun to talk of 
applying to join the International Metalworkers Federation, a move which would 
appear to be designed to limit NUNW-SWAPO links with the international trade 
secretariats, but also unlikely to be swallowed by the Federation.
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For CDM 1983 3aw output fall to 962,752 carat3 (from 1,014,464)^, the lowest 
level in over 30 years. 1984 output is unlikely to be much higher unless the 
high grade end of the diamond market recovers more than it had by mid-1984. 
Even at these levels CDM had been stockpiling and may hold over R100 million 
in 1981-19 8 3 production in excess of its Central Selling Organisation quota. 
The low CDM quota relates partly to its high proportion of large, quality 
stones for which the slump was greatest and the recovery is slowest but also 
to its apparent role as a "swing mine".
It was politically easier to cut the CDM than either the Botswanan or South
African mine quotas. This also had the advantage from the De 3eers viewpoint
of raising doubts about claims that CDM was seeking to mine out before
independence. In fact the record does not support that contention. The
highest recorded output was 2,034,000 carats in 1969 and over 1969-1980 output
fluctuated in the 1,500,000-2,000,000 range (2,001,000 in 1977) averaging
44about 1,750,000. Reserves are now given as 17 years - high by De 3eers
practice which usually proves only 12 years ahead - and exploration and
testing, especially upstream on the Orange, is being pursued intensively and
45viewed as promising.
In addition to the low key, worker oriented publicity CDM has sought from
supporting a Technical Institute and Concordia College (a non-racial secondary
school)^ as well as inservice training and from being a wage leader - 19 8 3
mumimum R281 per month from R260 keyed to the South African Minimum living
level estimates of the University of South Africa, average unskilled R464 per 
47month from R402 and all African workers probably about R500-550 per month - 
it achieved unwelcome high key notoriety in Namibia in 1934. The first hint 
probably came in November 1983 when Eric Lang mysteriously muttered about
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secret mining figures which he described as a "bombshell” and asserted he had
suppressed from a speech only after intervention by the AG and a South African 
48Cabinet Minister. The item might have been a rerun of the persistent claim
that Rossing's capacity is 6 or 8 or 10,000 tonnes versus the original design
capacity of 5,000, but is likely to have been the discrepancey between US
Department of Mines data on per carat value of US diamond imports and CDM's
declared selling prices to the CSO. This was the subject of a special report
to the Thirion Commission of Inquiry which suggested that over 1979-83 CDM had
4Qunderpriced by R1,000 million or over 40$, CDM’s answer was rejected by 
Justice Thirion with considerable annoyance. In the absence of both the memo 
and CDM's data a judgement is hard to reach. CDM pays at least a 10$ discount 
- possibly plus a stockpiling surcharge - to the CSO from the CSO's selling 
price. The US landed price is higher than the CSO selling price by one or two 
wholesaler's margins and costs. However at most this would seem to explain 
two thirds of the stated difference. If the USA prices are correct, either 
CDM is transfer pricing below true value or is paying a total discount and 
stockpiling surcharge in the 20 to 25$ range. While this might not lead to 
any tax saving for the Anglo-De Beers group (as opposed to a loss for 
”SWA/Namibia") it could put the profit outside the Rand Monetary area and its 
exchange controls, thus facilitating the group’s strategy of diversifying to 
reduce concentration of investment in a South Africa it apparently views as 
both cyclically unstable and politically risky.
Rossing - despite continued weakness in spot uranium oxide prices which rose 
from $17 a pound in September 1982 to over $20 at one point in 198 3 but then 
fell back to $17-5 by February 1984 - continued to be highly profitable with 
the fall of RTZ’3 share from £32 to £14 million^0 largely accounted for by 
Rossing's becoming fully taxable, secondarily by exchange rate fluctuations 
and only marginally by upward cost creep. Output continued to be near the
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5.000 ton stated installed capacity. Rossing proved new deep reserves to
lengthen the life expectancy of the mine/processing plant and engaged in
51prospecting for gold, copper and tungsten.
Tsumeb on the other hand remained in deficit with 1933 losses reaching R9.8m
cpfrom R8.8m in 1982. However, at least R3 million was in fact smelter
rehabilitation cost and R5.1 possibly non-recurring interest and excahnge rata 
fluctuation costs, so that the underlying position probably improved.
The smelter continued to do substantial contract work - 26,000 of a total of
54.000 tonnes of blister copper - and the manager expressed faith it would
53continue to operate on that basis long after Tsumeb was exhausted. The
company’s glacial progress in upgrading African workers - 9 up in posts 
"traditionally” held by Europeans (175 from 166, still under 25%) and 27 out 
of 76 apprentices at its technical training centre.
Control of Tsumeb passed to Goldfields of South Africa/Anglo with about 46* of
54the shares versus 30* for US based Newmont Mining. Surprisingly Anglo
(which effectively controls Consolidated) which had done a 1975 report highly
critical of Tsumeb allowed Newmont to remain managing agents and to hold 5 of 
13 Board seats versus Condolidated’s 3.
Growth of the mining sector and even maintenance of output depends on
development of new mines following exploration and proving. That process has 
been halted for several years because of political uncertainties and the 
implications of the ICJ- decision for mines begun after its decision in 1971 
(or 1966 when the Mandate was revoked). The outgoing Chamber of Mines 
president termed exploration and investment as far below the level Namibia's 
mineral potential deserved and warned that only a political settlement of a
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type which would end uncertainty and attract capital could save Namibia from
c trdescent into "third world penury". Britain's Ambassador to South Africa, 
Swen Ferguson at the same dinner spelled out - perhaps unwisely - what he saw 
such a settlement as requiring. That included close links with South Africa 
to provide the finance and personnel to maintain the existing infrastructure 
and to attract the expertise and capital of the international mining 
industry.^
During 1983/84 four studies appeared on the Namibian mining sector which is
rapidly becoming relatively well studied from an applied economic point of
view. These included: Mines and Independence by Paul Spray in the Catholic
57Institute for International Relations, "Future for Namibia" series ; a
revised edition of the Commonwealth Secretariat's The Mineral Industry of
Namibia^ , a study TNC-State Relations: Fiscal and Financial Issues by Mike
cq¿Taber, R. H. Green and C. Harvey of IDS (Sussex) and a UNIN "Namibian
Studies" series monograph by H. S. Aulakh and W. W. Asombang^0 . All/
concentrated on evaluating the sector's role in the present economy, its 
potential in an independent Namibia and how a transition for the first to the 
second could be achieved following independence.
Agriculture - Running Down
The rundown in agricultural output which began in 1977 has continued 
unabated.^' In 1975 prices 1983 output was of the order of R55 million versus 
about R100 million in 1976. Cattle herds are down by from one third to one 
half and karakul by over one half. These trends have been disguised to date 
by abnormally high slaughter rates to avoid death from lack of grazing, to
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keep up cash flow or in closing down sales - probably at least a quarter of 
all farmers have sold out since 1980.
Administrator General von Niekirk estimates the state subsidy per ranch at 
62R35,000 - if true over R150 million a year or of the same order of magnitude
as the sector’s total value added. That figure appears in fact to be an
amalgam of ’SWA/Namibia'1 agricultural and water affairs recurrent and capital 
budgetary expenditure plus Land Bank and ENOK (Development Corporation) 
support.^ Even so it implies that the agricultural sector is totally non 
viable. In addition to drought, slow price .increases - falls for beef in 198 3 
and 1984 and over 50Í falls for karakul over 1977-82 before a small recovery 
to R 13•5 per pelt in early 1984 - and lack of security in most of the ranching 
areas north of Windhoek have severely damaged the sector. In fact even at its 
1 9 7 6 - 7 peak it was not economically efficient - despite very low wages to its 
Africn labour force and substantial state supporting services it yielded at 
best an S% return before tax on capital employed. By 1979 the net return 
had gone negative and has remained there. Most farmers are heavily indebted 
and carry on only by grace of ENOK and Land Bank credit and/or amalgamations, 
doing so because they cannot recover their capital and do make a living 
managing the properties.
While the very severe drought of 1978/9 - 1982/3 was partly broken in 1 9 8 3
conditions - especially in the north remained dire through early 1984. So
much so indeed that UN Secretary general de Cuellar, after consultation with
SWAPO, appealed to voluntary agencies - especially the Red Cross - to make
66food relief available. _ In 1984 some - but by no means ail- of the northern
and central areas did receive rain in April but after the Otavi area
commercial maize crop had already been downgraded to 50Í of output by the
• h 67 earlier dry period.
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Livestock marketing and slaughtering capacity - now in fact well above 
plausible offtake levels except in relation to northern African mixed farmers 
- became more and more underutilised during 1983-84. The R17 million new 
abbatoir at Gobabis completed early in 1983 by ENOK was de facto mothballed
C Q
after test slaughtering. The Otavi plant was operating only five months a
year^ and at the low season in 1983 live exports were down to 2,150 a week
and slaughter to 500.^° As peak figures were of the order of 3>50Q slaughter 
and 2,500-3,000 live a week, this suggests that 1983 offtake may have been as 
low as 250,000 versus over 400,000 in peak years and that, given 3tock rundown 
1984 may be lower still.
Fishing - Looking Up?
Inshore fishing data are increasingly confused by the division between
"SWA/Namibia" in whose water they are caught and Walvis 3ay (nominally part of
Capetown) where they are landed and processed. The 1970’s and early 1980's
rundown of the inshore and to a lesser extent the deep sea industry by
over-exploitation was well documented in Exploiting the Sea by Richard Moorsom
71published by the Catholic Institute for International Relations. The
Department of Economic Affairs in Windhoek's 1983 report was also highly
critical of overfishing albeit it concentrated its criticism - as did the AG
in his gloss on it - on the foreign vessels which dominate the deep sea
fishing and in particular on the Soviet, Cuban, Rumanian, Polish, Bulgarian
72and German Democratic Republic fleets. “ The scientific committee report
stressed that both pilchard and anchovy - the dominant inshore catch varieties 
before their near extinction forced a shift to concentration on the cape horse 
mackerel - are "endangered species" and that a cautious quota policy was
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needed for them as a matter of urgency within a broader fish resource 
information, management and quota system.^ Such advice has been given before 
but ignored as soon as catches recovered.
Ironically, 1983 and 1984 have 3een a partial recovery of inshore stocks and
an apparent rise in deep sea catch with the 1984 International Commission of
Deep Sea Fisheries quotas raised to 1.2 million t o n n e s . I n  1983 SWA Fishing
Industries raised its profits 47$ to R5 million on moderate increases in
mackerel and anchovy catches, a small (quota constrained) increase in
pilchards and a marked recovery in lobster landings.'^ In April 1984 the
three remaining (of ten) operational processing factories in Walvis 3ay were
operating at capacity as a result of the return of what appeared to be much
7 6larger pilchard schools than in any of the three previous years.
The administration and the companies are notably querulous over who gains.
The latter condemn the deep sea vessels for eroding schools before they reach
inshore waters while the former also complain that "SWA-Namibia" does not
benefit from Walvis Bay based trawlers catching "SWA-Namibia" fish for landing
and processing at Walvis Bay. Indeed the Secretary for Economic Affairs
implied that on the end of 1984 expiry of quotas held by Walvis 3ay plants
either these would be shifted to Luderitz factories or fees would be charged
77to lead to "greater benefits financially for SWA".
The Cost Of Occupation And The Case For Withdrawal
South Africa has over the past year been more willing than before to say how
78much Namibia costs it to hold - partly to prepare its own white population 
for withdrawal when and if it decides to do that, partly to give the
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impression of wanting to get out to the international community and partly to 
give the impression that Namibia will inevitably be an economically unsound 
and unstable place after independence (a useful ploy either for deterring 
pressure on RSA to leave or for mashing that post-independence problems are 
resulting from RSA destabilisation).
South Africa’s asserted 1984/85 cost is R1,143 million - Defence R663 million, 
Customs payment R250 million, Budgetary transfer R318 million, South African 
Transport Services Deficit R95 million.^ Other estimates of Defence tend to
On
be higher, e.g. R800 million by the Financial Times. However, a rather more 
complete matrix of economic costs and benefits is needed to get a net figure.
First, defence costs relating to Namibia - including Angola adventures 
unnecessary if Namibia were independent and the partly built "Orange River" 
line including its command air base at Upington put into operation - are at 
least a third of defence, security service and national level police, and 
defence related (buildup of production infrastructure) costs or - say - R 1,500 
million. Second, the likelihood that the "external borrowing" from RSA 
financial institutions can or will be repaid is very slim so R200 million 
needs to be added on that head largely offsetting the transfer in respect to 
customs/excise which is basically a (rather cost effective) purchase of an 
export market. The gross cost of holding Namibia is therefore running at 
about R2,100 million a year equivalent to 9Í of total South African 1984/85 
government spending estimates. Against that can be set private capital 
outflows to RSA, profit and salary remittances and imports at below world 
prices (fishmeal and - p.erhaps - diamonds). These may total R350-400 million 
reducing the net cost to R1,700-1,750 million but it is clear that since 1979 
SWAPO, recession and weather have turned Namibia from a valuable economic 
asset into a significant burden for South Africa. The answer "It pays" to the
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question "Why does RSA hold on?" is no longer valid and is never likely to be 
again.
That fact alone might well not cause RSA to decide to withdraw - albeit at a 
time of severe economic malaise at home it is a consideration especially to 
the Treasury. But it does not stand by itself. South Africa’s security force
i
internal debate between advocates of "into laager" (compact defence perimeter
plus low cost destabilisation) versus "strike komando" (move into the enemy's
country, practice high profile destabilisation, seek to install ’friendly’
governments based on the destabilsation units) seems to have swung toward the
laager advocates who fairly clearly now include Defence Minister Malan, Army
Commander (sometime "SWA/Namibia" commander and Mariental born) Geldenhuys and
the new Commanding Officer "SWA/Namibia". The Orange River Line and its key
command air base at Upington are being built - they make no sense if RSA is
sure it intends to stay in Namibia. Berth internal security considerations
(spare troops to hand to put down mass strikes, boycotts or riots in several
towns at once without resorting to massive killing) and the morale effect of
81the death toll are considerations. RSA figures of 77 killed in action in
1982 may be true so far as they go. However, RSA case by case announcements
of military personnel dying in Angola/Namibia in 1982 from all causes (in
action, wounds, disease, transport accidents, shooting selves or fellow
32troops, etc) add up to about 350. If about S0% were white that is 500 and 
suggests a 1975-1983 toll of 2,000-2,500. A3 a proportion of the white South 
African community that is 3 times the lives the USA lost in Vietnam, which 
suggests that despite announcement management to avoid the total being 
publicised the seepage- of morale in the armed forces and of political 
conviction generally must be significant.
Political considerations - at least once the Executive President and triple
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Parliament cum Presidential Council are in place - also have elements
favouring a withdrawal. First, the Foreign Ministry clearly finds Namibia an
albatross around its neck (perhaps especially in terms of capitalising on 
Nkomati and the ’new constitutional dispensation’) - a point Prime Minister 
Botha may take more seriously after discussion during his June 1984 European 
trip. Second, while ’Who lost Namibia?’ will be a rallying cry for the 50% of 
Afrikaans voters who said "No” in the referendum and now vote CP/HNP, it is 
hard to see how they can be won back and the rallying cry will be less useable
in a 1988 election if the settlement is in 1985. Finally the business
community - including at least some of its Afrikaner fraction - wants a
settlement to cut government costs and to ease their pursuit of regional
8 8markets and investment opportunities. The Financial Mail , usually a valid 
spokesman for the main line business community, speculates that RSA will 
settle soon and that for it "linkage” is not the bottom line, because with 
Namibia independent and not providing bases or military transit to the ANC, 
Cubans in Angola are no more relevant than in Ethiopia. It pretty openly 
suggests RSA is likely to ’sell out’ to the USA after the November US election 
- a fear Undersecretary Crocker shares if his rattled denunciation of the
Lusaka talks, and possible future RSA-SWAPO talks without a US presence, is
, 84anything to go by.
But even if RSA'3 leaders are moving toward a decision to leave Namibia even 
if that means 435 and a SWAPO government - the latter they must by now 
consider an inevitable consequence of an internationally saleable withdrawal 
and election process - what do they see as the relationships between RSA and 
independent Namibia? One bottom line Í3 clear - no foreign troops, no ANC 
bases or military transit routes. 3eyond that the assumption that RSA would 
3eek either a tight neo-colonial control to make a SWAPO government a de_ facto 
puppet or a modus vivendi on the Botswana model with substantial freedom of
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Namibian manoeuvre so long as profitable (to RSA) economic links were at worst 
3lowly eroded and no real RSA security interests were directly threatened may 
be wrong. The tight neo-colonial pattern 3eems unlikely to be feasible. 
Namibia has more room to manoeuvre than Botswana - and via a route to the sea 
can increase Botswana's. Further Botswana’3 step by step broadening of its 
room for manoeuvre and quiet biit increasingly tough political stance toward
RSA cannot be viewed with equanimity by Pretoria.
There is another strategic option open to RSA. That is planning and building 
the infrastructure for destablilsation of Namibia before its independence.
That might not be very fruitful in terms of economic gains, but it could - if
it worked - ensure that Namibia was nearly paralysed at little out of pocket
cost to South Africa and that Botswana remained effectively cut off from the 
Atlantic. Once that strategic option is seen as conceiveable, closer 
inspection suggests that South Africa may very well be pursuing it already.
Pre Independence Destabilsation?
Whether by design or side consequences of decisions taken for other reasons, 
SouthAfrica has since 1979 set up what amounts to a pre independence 
infrastructure for destabilising an independent Namibia.
First, it has built up a purported external debt which will be a heavy burden 
on the government and foreign exchange budgets if accepted and a possible 
lever to use to reduce -international confidence in Namibia if repudiated as 
void ab initio.
Second, it has created a budgetary position that creates the impression that
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independent Namibia must be a fiscal "basket case" and - unless radically and 
promptly overhauled - could make that impression valid.
/
Third, it has - via the "RA's" created an administrative monstrosity which is 
inherently cost inefficient, bureaucratically incompetent, subject to 
corruption and hard to dismantle and reorganise rapidly.
Fourth, it has via its creation of an administrative, professional, political, 
"security service" black middle class - created a group some of whose skills 
will be critical to an independent Namibia but who will have vested interests 
in maintaining real income levels inconsistent with regaining fiscal balance, 
extending basic services to the whole population and raising the real income 
of the other 85* of the African population.
Fifth, it has via this middle class, the Koevet - Home Guard - SWATF black 
"security personnel" and the more disreputable of the Multi Party Conference 
politicians created the class base, gunmen and political cover for a Namibian 
MNR, (JNITA or "Super Zapu" immediately to hand and with existing links to RSA 
personnel and institutions at independence.
Sixth* by reinforcing its practical position in respect to Walvis Bay it has 
ensured that it has a choke point to control Namibian policy or to turn on and 
off to destabilise at its pleasure unless and until Namibia devotes scarce 
time, personnel and finance to reactivating Swakopmund or building a new port.
Seventh, the sea bastion of its new "Orange River Line" - at Alexander's Bay - 
is within random mortar or launch based naval paracommando range of Namibia's 
greatest economic asset - the Oranjemund diamond mining headquarters - while a 
reactivated Swakopmund would stand in the same relation to Rooikamp on the
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peninsula north of Walvis Bay and to any positions on the south bank of the 
Swakop estuary.
Each of these actions can be explained on grounds either of mobilizing support 
for staying in Namibia and/or for exerting influence over an independent 
Namibia consistent with letting it prosper if it does not threaten South 
Africa too directly (the use of South African power vis a vis Botswana to
date). But taken together they add up to such a complete infrastructure for 
destabilisation as to suggest that they are - at least at one level - intended 
for that purpose. South Africa's leadership on that evidence is at least 
considering the option of systematic destabilisation of Namibia from the day 
of independence whatever Namibia does and is not (or at least tentatively not)
interested in a Botswana type modus vivendi. Thi3, if it is in the event
South Africa's strategy, bodes ill for independent Namibia and seems to
require specific pre-independence contingency planning both to minimize 
economic, social and political damage in Namibia and to maximize international 
perception of South Africa as a terrorist aggressor and Namibia as an innocent 
victim - the latter being a very clear element in Botswana’s strategy of 
giving RSA as few pegs on which to hang excuses for destabilisation as 
possible.
Looking Toward And Planning For A Future
As cited above^ CDM’3 Hoffe has done a perspective on an independent Namibia 
- economically and in relations with South Africa like 1970’3 Botswana - he 
believes would be good for CDM and politically saleable and has set out to 
sell it. In that repect CDM is the most forward looking of the transnationals 
in Namibia - after Tanzanian, Zambian, Botswanan and Angolan experience it
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believes it can influence, or at least find common ground with, almost any 
independent African state.
In that it is not typical - RTZ blandly asserts and reasserts that anybody
pitching it out would be foolish but could only be reminded to start on decent
housing when an Anglican bishop dragged its late Chairman out to Arandis,
thought breaking the NUNW a contribution to long run labour stability, broke
off semi-formal talks with SWAPO and has apparently forgotten the lessons of
its Bougainville Mine in Papua-New Guinea where major revision of a highly
unequal pre-independence set of arrangements during the transition to full
independence has proved the key to a stable relationship and continued (if
86reduced) RTZ profits. Its response - via the Rossing General Manager -
87to Mines and Indpendence was typical "mining engineers should read this 
booklet to be made aware that mining consists of far more than the extraction 
and sale of minerals. It will give them an excellent insight into the need to 
employ good public relations officers to protect them from such unwarranted 
criticism". Some observers might think that an odd - not to say counter 
productive - way to plan to meet a SWAPO negotiating team and its technical 
advisors at independence.
Similarly the settler community was also divided on how to face the future. 
Aktur and the DTA appeared to want to do it by retreating to 1904 Sudwest 
Afrika and 1979 "Zimbabwe/Rhodesia" respectively. The Federal Party was 
paralysed seeing no hope in the MPC and no evident future as a club of English 
speaking managers and professionals. The German Interest Group and the German 
led Christian Democratic Party were more innovative. The former ditched the 
DTA and entered into dialogue with SWAPO ending as an "associated group" in 
SWAPO ’ 3 delegation to the Lusaka talks and with one of its prominent members 
—n open oWAPC member and s^ n i^s uusaka delegation. The CDP first went to
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the MPC, then pulled out denouncing them as a fraudulent, sterile anti SWAPO 
cabal. It too ended as a SWAPO "associated group" at Lusaka. These two 
groups’ broad goals are clear - to assure a place in independent Namibia for 
their rancher, professional, technical civil servant and small business 
members perhaps rather like that which has evolved in Zimbabwe. From 1981’s 
Geneva talks on, they have been learning that on that range of topics SWAPO is 
quite willing to enter into dialogue with them as spokesmen for clusters of 
potential white Namibians.
•
However, the main body of pre-independence planning centres on SWAPO and those 
working with it. SWAPO itself has continued to participate in topical and 
sectoral planning seminars, e.g. with the United Nations Institute for Namibia 
on mining and on health, with the UN Centre on Transnational Corporations on 
negotiations with TNC’s, with the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Coorperation 
on the teaching of English. It also is sending - directly and via UNIN - a 
growing number of its cadres to university, post graduate and specialised 
short courses. Finally it has embarked on elaborating and articulating its 
economic policy which - partly for tactical reasons, partly for lack of time 
and partly because independence seemed very distant - has to date been clear 
on principles and some priorities and acceptable approaches but decidedly 
incomplete or undetailed on a number of key issues and time sequences.
UNIN by the end of 1984 will have expanded its "Namibian Studies" series to 
eight titles ranging from constitutional options through health to overall 
economic strategy as well as producing an annotated bibliography of political 
economic publications and theses on Namibia. In addition it is pulling 
together its own work and using consultants for a comprehensive study designed 
to provide basic information and pose key questions and options to inform the 
independent Namibia government’s elaboration and adoption of a transitional
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development plan.
On a smaller scale CIIR has expanded its "Future for Namibia" series to five 
volumes - general, agriculture, education, fishing and mining - with two more 
- women and overall economic - planned. A -seminar of researchers on Namibia 
was held in July 1984 at the Commonwealth Institute of the University of 
London with the cooperation of the Namibia Support Group who also organised a 
December 1983 seminar on health care. The 100th Anniversary of the German 
flag over Windhoek in September 1984 will be marked by a conference sponsored 
by individuals associated with or sympathetic to SWAPO from Hage Geingob 
through Sean McBride and Archbishop Huddlestone.. to Randolph Vigne and Terence 
Ranger. Its aim is to focus academic, political and media attention on the 
liberation struggle, on the issues which will confront Namibia on independence 
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